Abstract-Assessing biometric performance is challenging because an experimental outcome depends on the choice of demographics and the chosen application scenario of an experiment. If one can quantify biometric samples into good, bad, and ugly categories for one application, the proportion of these categories is likely to be different for another application. As a result, a typical performance curve of a biometric experiment cannot generalize to another different application setting, even though the same system is used. We propose an algorithm that is capable of generalizing a biometric performance curve in terms of detection error tradeoff or equivalently receiver's operating characteristics, by allowing the user (system operator, policymaker, and biometric researcher) to explicitly set the proportion of data differently. This offers the possibility for the user to simulate different operating conditions that can better match the setting of a target application. We demonstrated the utility of the algorithm in three scenarios, namely: 1) estimating the system performance under varying quality; 2) spoof and zero-effort attacks; and 3) cross-device matching. Based on the results of 1300 use-case experiments, we found that the quality of prediction on unseen (test) data, measured in terms of coverage, is typically between 60% and 80%, which is significantly better than random, that is, 50%.
I. INTRODUCTION

B
IOMETRIC authentication is a process of verifying an identity claim using a person's behavioural and physiological characteristics. Several factors affect a biometric system's performance. Some of them are the deformable nature of biometric traits, corruption by environmental noise, variability of biometric traits over time, the state of users (especially behavioural biometrics) and occlusion by the user's accessories. As a consequence, even if two biometric samples are acquired from the same user, the system cannot produce exactly the same output score. Therefore, when assessing the performance, the uncertainty introduced by these numerous and often uncontrolled distortions has to be taken into account.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS. 2015.2434320 of different factors on the resultant system performance. For instance, if they know that there are certain proportions of "good", "bad", and "ugly" samples, then the proposed tool enables them to freely mix the prior probability so as to match the specifications of a target application. This allows a certain degree of generalisation to a typical biometric performance curve, in the form of Detection Error Trade-off (DET) or equivalently Receiver's Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve. This curve is a plot of False Non-match Rate (FNMR) or False Rejection Rate in the Y-axis versus the False Match Rate (FMR) or False Acceptance Rate in the X-axis. We present three use-case scenarios where our biometric performance simulation tool can be used:
• Assessing Biometric System Performance Under Different Attack Strategies: The robustness of a biometric system under attack depends on the types of material that are used to produce a spoof sample, the level of skill of the impostor, and/or simply the resources available to an impostor. Attacks that are easy to carry out such as zero-effort attack (i.e. live imposter sample) may be more prevalent than expensive but more destructive ones. The proposed algorithm offers the possibility of evaluating the robustness of a biometric system under different assumptions in the proportion of attacks that can better match a target adverse operating environment.
• Assessing Biometric System Performance Operating With
Multiple Sensors: In border controls, it is expected that a biometric system will operate with several sensors. For instance, a biometric sensor installed at the port of entry may be necessarily not the same as the one installed at a corresponding port of exit. In practice, it is common to have several ports of entry and ports of exit. In another scenario, older worn sensors may be replaced by newer ones but of a different type. In both examples, one has to deal with a practical problem whereby a biometric system has to compare two samples acquired by two different sensors. Under cross-sensor comparison, the system performance may be suboptimal [8] , [9] . This degradation can be observed in all common used biometric traits in border control such as face, fingerprint and iris. When a biometric system operates in an environment where there is a certain mixing of proportions of same-device versus cross-device comparisons, the proposed algorithm can be used to simulate the performance. This permits a more realistic estimation of the number of false alarm cases.
• Assessing Biometric System Performance Under Varying
Sample Quality or Operating Conditions: It is now well accepted that biometric system performance is dependent on a sample population to some extent. For instance, it has been documented that the fingerprint recognition rates of older women and workers in certain industries are likely to be lower than those of the general population [4] - [6] . When the proportion of demographics of a design data set is significantly different from that of a target operating environment, it is unlikely that the biometric performance curve, as measured on the design data set, is representative of the target operating environment. By appropriately setting the prior of the demographics, the proposed algorithm can be used to produce a certain generalised performance that better matches the target population of biometric end-users. One pre-requisite to predicting or modelling the biometric system performance under different operating conditions is the need to quantify the certainty of the predicted performance, e.g., in terms of upper or lower performance bands. For this reason, we derive the confidence interval around a predicted DET curve using a bootstrap strategy. Unfortunately, the conventional bootstrap sampling is not appropriate since it assumes that the samples are independent and identically distributed. Indeed, the scores of a biometric experiment outcome contain correlation structures that violate this assumption. In particular, the similarity scores of the match pair are correlated. In fact, similar correlation structure also exists for non-match scores as well [11] . Consequently, the resultant confidence intervals are under-estimated [1] . For this reason, we shall use a two-step bootstrap strategy proposed in [10] .
A demonstration of bootstrapped DET curves and their resultant confidence intervals is shown in Figure 1 . For a video animation, check out http://youtu.be/VUgJ1xh4sOU.
Our contributions can be summarised as follow:
• An algorithmic framework to generalize DET curves to different prior probability of factors • Deployment of bootstrap subset, coupled with DET angles, in order to derive confidence intervals around the predicted DET curve.
• Objective assessment of the proposed algorithm on 1,300 experiments due to 4 data sets and 13 use-case scenarios, in terms of coverage, on an unseen data set with a different subject population. To date, a DET curve remains 'locked' on the data set it has been evaluating. Our tool makes it possible to generalize a DET curve to an unseen scenario. This remains a difficult problem with little research addressing this issue directly. Therefore, we have worked to fill this gap and demonstrated the feasibility of generalizing DET curves.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: a methodology of our proposed algorithm is described in Section II. In Section III, we present some use-cases and demonstration. Discussions on how well our proposed procedure predicts an unseen DET curve using the confidence intervals are presented in Section IV. Lastly Section V concludes this paper.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Overview
To predict biometric performance on a new unseen operating condition, we first need to determine a number of noise factors in the similarity scores for both the match and non-match comparisons separately. Let us consider the following scenarios:
• Matching Under Different Attack Types: It is possible and indeed desirable to divide non-match scores into their nature of attack, such as zero-effort attack and spoof attack based on different fabrication materials.
• Matching With Multiple Sensors: In a multi-sensor environment, it is common to have the template produced by one sensor to be matched by a query sample produced by another sensor. If there are N sensor, then the total number of factors is "n choose 2", or n(n − 1)/2 + n for any combination of two sensors and the template and query generated by the same sensor. [12] , for instance. Therefore, under demographic shifts, it is reasonable to expect that the system may perform differently for different demographic sectors. For this reason, it is sensible to use the demographic information as a factor. We now describe the overall architecture of the proposed system. Let us consider the non-match comparison scores first. For each of the score sets representing a given factor, one can proceed to estimating its cumulative density function cdf, from which a number of bootstraps can be generated. The bootstrapped curves are then combined in such a way that if there are |Q| score sets each containing N bootstrapped cdf curves, one obtains N combined non-match cdf s. The combination module weighs the |Q| factors using mixing coefficients that are set by the user. The process is then repeated for the match comparison scores, hence obtaining another N combined match cdf curves. The two sets of curves are combined to form N bootstrapped DET curves from which the confidence intervals of the DET curves are estimated. Figure 2 illustrates a data flow diagram of the proposed algorithm.
The basis for which the cdf s of different factors are combined is rooted in the Bayesian theorem, which is described in Section II-B. The cdf s-combination procedure is described first because it is the key ingredient in making performance generalisation possible. The bootstrapping procedure that considers the correlation structure of similarity scores is described in Section II-C. Finally, we present the procedure of estimating DET confidence given a set of bootstrapped DET curves in Section II-D. These three components, namely, combining cdf s, bootstrapping, and DET confidence, form the basis of the proposed performance generalisation algorithm, which is summarised in Section II-E.
B. Conditional Estimate of cdf
To begin, we consider a conditioning variable, Q, to be discrete and disjoint from one another. The distribution of a factor-specific class-conditional score can then be described by p(y|ω k , Q) for a biometric similarity score y and class ω k where ω 1 denotes a match (genuine) comparison and ω 0 denotes a non-match (impostor) comparison. Therefore, if the score is similarity score, we expect that
, that is the mean match score is greater than the mean nonmatch score. The score distribution independent of any factor, p(y|ω k ), is simply a mixture of the factor-specific score distributions weighted by their respective prior probability of the factor, P(Q|ω k ) , i.e.,
where we note that the prior probability of the factor P(Q|ω k ) is dependent on the class of comparison, ω k . This conditioning On the other hand, if we consider the scenario of spoofing with different materials, then, P(Q|ω 1 ) is always 1 for live, genuine (match) comparison whereas P(Q|ω 0 ) takes several different values for different spoof fabrication materials. Let us consider the fingerprint database that we will be using. In this case, Q denotes that a query sample is either a live one or produced by any of the five fake fingerprint fabrication materials, i.e., Q ∈ {Live, Ecoflex, Gelatine, Latex, Silgum, WoodGlue}. In the above two examples, the probability tables should take the form as shown in Tables I and II, respectively. We note that i m i = 1.
The reader should appreciate the "overloaded" meaning of variable Q. This is because it allows us to convenient apply the conditioning variable to the data set by simply specifying P(Q|ω k ). Throughout this paper, Q is considered a conditioning variable, or a "factor", in the most general context. However, the user has to be sensible when specifying values for P(Q|ω k ). For instance, it is not possible to have a live sample fabricated by any material. For this reason, in Table I , P(Q = Live|ω 0 ) is always zero whereas P(Q = Live|ω 1 ) is always one. As a second example, in the case where Q denotes the quality level of a sample, it will need to set P(Q|ω 0 ) and P(Q|ω 1 ) carefully because they are likely to have different values. For example, in real biometric applications, a genuine user will likely interact in a more correct way with the sensor than an imposter, leading to a better quality of samples, i.e, P(Q = high|ω 1 ) dominates over other quality levels whereas P(Q = low|ω 0 ) dominates in the case of impostor attempts. There these priors have to be set differently for differet P(Q|ω k ), as examplified by Table II. Very often, the form of distribution of p(y|ω k , Q), is assumed to be estimated via a parametric technique such as any exponential family of one dimensional distribution or else a non-parametric technique such as the Parzen window or kernel density.
Fortunately, since our ultimate purpose is to estimate biometric performance, we do not need to estimate any density. Instead, we need only to estimate of cumulative density function (cdf) of the scores for a given decision threshold τ . Starting from Eqn. (1), we can see that the cdf of factorindependent score, P(y < τ|ω k ), is the summation of the mixture of cdfs of factor-specific score, P(y < τ|ω k , Q), weighted by their respective probability factor table, P(Q|ω k ), i.e.,
The False Match Rate (FMR) is defined by the 1-cdf of similarity scores belonged to non-match class, ω 0 , being greater than the decision threshold, τ , whereas the the False Non-match Rate (FNMR) is defined by the cdf of similarity scores belonged to match class, ω 1 , being smaller than the decision threshold, τ , that is:
We note that FMR is a monotonic decreasing function of the decision threshold whereas FNMR is a monotonic increasing function of the decision threshold in the similarity score space. In order to estimate FMR and FNMR for a given test or target operation, we substitute Eqn. (2) into the above two equations. In this process, we need to further precise that P train (y < τ|ω 1 , Q) comes from the training or design data whereas P test (Q|ω k ) depends only on the target test or operational condition. The resultant predicted FMR and FNMR are given by:
respectively, for all possible τ values. We can then plot a ROC or DET curve based on the pair (FMR, FNMR) for all possible τ values. The main assumption deployed in Eqn. (5) and Eqn. (6) is that the error rate curve of a given factor remains the same in the design and operational (test) conditions. This is to saŷ P train (y < τ|ω 0 , Q) andP test (y < τ|ω 0 , Q) are the same. This condition is satisfied if, and only if, all other factors remain the same between the design (train) and operational (test) conditions. What is not required to remain the same is the prior probability of the factors P(Q|ω k ), which can vary across the two data sets. In addition, the subjects in the design and operational conditions may also be mutually exclusive. This corresponds to a typical evaluation scenario where the biometric samples used for algorithm development and those used for a target application belong to two disjoint population of subjects.
Because of the difference in subject composition, one cannot guarantee thatP train (y < τ|ω 1 , Q) andP test (y < τ|ω 1 , Q) are the same. The only way to validate the assumption is by carrying out evaluations. This will be further discussed in Section IV.
Algorithm 1 The Bootstrap_Subset Procedure
INPUT:
• ϒ, the range of decision thresholds sampled at regular intervals • N, the number of bootstraps
C. Subset Bootstrapping of cdf
The conventional confidence interval estimation assumes that all samples are independent and identically distributed. This assumption is violated in any outcome of a biometric experiment. This is because the comparison scores originated from the same template are dependent on each other. For this reason, if there are U users, the user identity set with replacement should be used to sample. The scores that are associated with the bootstrapped user set will then constitute a bootstrapped sample of the scores which then constitute the data required to estimate the cdf. A set of these cdf's form the basis for the estimates of FMR and FNMR.
Suppose that there are U enrolled users in the set, u ∈ U = {1, . . . , U }. The scores of these users can be further divided into match and non-match scores; they are denoted by
The bootstrapping procedure takes the above two sets of scores and produces N FMR and FNMR curves, as shown in Algorithm 1. The function "bootstrap" takes a set of identity and returns another set of identities with possible repetitions. The algorithm outputs a set of FMR and FNMR curves.
The reader should note that FMR and FNMR are continuous functions and should be sampled at different locations specified by τ ∈ ϒ. ϒ should cover the possible range of values that a similarity score can take but the number of samples does not need to be excessive, as long as the resultant FMR and FNMR are smooth.
D. Representing DET in Polar Coordinate System
The objective of this section is to characterise the confidence interval ofFMR test (τ ) andFNMR test (τ ) respectively. Since the target chart we will visualise is a DET curve, following Martin et al's work, we will work on the inverse cdf of the Gaussian distribution. If (·) is the cdf of a Gaussian distribution, and −1 (·) its inverse, a DET curve is plotted in the coordinate system of
There are three ways to define the confidence intervals of a DET curve, as discussed in Poh et al. [10] . For example, the FMR can be fixed and the confidence intervals of the corresponding FNMR are then defined. This is called vertical averaging. Another method is to average the FMR and FNMR for a given threshold. This strategy is called threshold averaging. A third method is called "simultaneous joint confidence regions", which does not fix any threshold nor any axes on the DET plan but instead estimates a confidence region based on a set of paired (FMR,FNMR) data points directly. Two variants were reported in [2] , i.e., fixed-width band [3] and working-hotelling band [13] . The fixed-width band method, in our context, obtains a confidence region that is defined by two parallel DETs 1 with a fixed width distance such that the original observed DET is fully contained inside the region. The working-hotelling band fits the best regression line in the DET plan. Therefore, it assumes that the class-conditional scores follow a Gaussian distribution.
We follow the third approach as documented in [10] . We first work in the polar coordinate of v, which can be expressed in (θ, r ) where
and (8), shown at the bottom of the page, for θ
) is the origin. Since −1 (−∞) = −∞, in practice, we replace the origin with the point
where T is the total number of non-match (impostor) comparisons rounded to the nearest and the larger power of 10. For example, if the number of impostor attempts is 3,800, then 10,000 can be used.
In order to reverse the process from the polar coordinate to the Cartesian coordinate v, we can apply the following equations,
The FMR(τ ) and FNMR(τ ) is then obtained by applying the cdf of the Gaussian distribution, (·), on v, i.e., FMR = (v F M R ) and FNMR = (v F N M R ), respectively. To obtain α×100% confidence given the set of bootstrapped DET curves in polar coordinates, we estimate the lower and upper bounds as:
where θ (r ) is the empirical cdf of the radius r observed from the bootstrapped curves for a given θ , since each bootstrapped curve cuts through θ exactly once. The lower and upper r will be given by r lower = 
The upper (less optimistic) DET curve is defined similarly. By convention, the significance threshold α is set to 0.05 so that one obtains a 95% level of confidence. Note that DET angle was reported in [1] to combine several DET curves into a single one. Although DET angle seems to be an uncommon choice, three θ values are extremely commonly used: {0, π 4 , π 2 }. They correspond respectively to the estimate of confidence interval of FMR at FNMR = 0, EER and that of FNMR at FMR = 0. Therefore, the procedure described here can be seen as a generalization to this practice.
E. Overall Algorithm
Having discussed the three core components of the generalised DET prediction algorithm, this section puts the algorithms together more formally. To begin, we note that FMR and FNMR are each a function of the common τ ∈ ϒ. For this reason, for simplicity, we omit τ . So, the reader should keep in mind that FMR is a curve and in implementation, it is a vector of length |ϒ|.
In addition, we need to introduce factor-dependent score set, Y
, 1}, such that the union of the scores forms the score set Y U k that we have defined earlier:
Finally, just before presenting the algorithm, we will also need the following procedures, presented in the form of "procedure : input → output" to aid our explanation:
• DET2radius: FMR, FNMR → {(θ, r )|θ ∈ } DET2radius takes FMR and FNMR as input and produces the corresponding points in polar coordinates, as described by Eqn. (7) and Eqn. (8) , as shown bottom of this page. Percentile takes a set of real-numbered data as input and produces the desired percentage at 5%, 50%(medium) and 95% of the data. Having formalized the variables, we are now ready to present the generalized DET curve with factors that produce confidence intervals, as shown in Algorithm 2. The main arguments of the procedure are: (1) the number of bootstraps, N; (2) |Q| factor-dependent match score sets and (3) their desired probabilities on the target operation, P(Q|ω 1 ); as well as (4) |Q| factor-dependent non-match score sets, and (5) their desired prior probabilities on the target operation, P(Q|ω 0 ). The procedure returns the confidence intervals of the predicted DET curve corresponding to the target operation in terms of the expected FMR and FNMR, as well as their upper and lower bounds.
The two arguments to DET2radius, i.e., 
implements Eqn. (5) and Eqn. (6), respectively. DET2radius is called in a loop of N iterations in order to process the N bootstrapped FMRs and FNMRs.
III. DEMONSTRATIONS
A. Database, Protocols
We have chosen to use the LivDet 2011 data set [7] for our demonstrations and experiments because this database has a number of unique features. First, the fingerprint images have been acquired using two different sensors. This allows us to perform cross-sensor comparison whereby the system is required to compare two samples obtained using two different sensors. The database also contains spoof fingerprint impressions made by five different fabrication materials. These materials are EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex, Silgum and WoodGlue. This allows us to evaluate the performance predicted using both zero-effort and nonzero-effort attacks at different proportions. Third, the database contains live fingerprint of different quality, thus, enabling us to study the effect of various levels of fingerprint quality on system performance as nonzero effort attack.
The LivDET 2011 database contains 8000 samples. The most important key statistics relevant for our experiments are:
• 144 unique fingers containing both live and spoof samples.
• 128 unique fingers containing only live samples.
• 4000 fingerprints acquired using the Biometrika sensor, and another 4000 acquired using the Italdata sensor.
• 800 fake fingerprint samples for each of the five fabrication materials.
1) Experimental Protocol:
In order to estimate the quality of prediction, we kept the 144 fingers which have both live and spoof samples as enrolment identities (constituting the gallery set). In this way, we have both live and spoof comparison scores which can be further divided into match and nonmatch comparisons. Let u denote an identity drawn from the set of identities, U. We divide U into two smaller sets U train and U test of equal size but containing identities that are mutually exclusive. Let Y train denote the comparison scores generated from U train ; and similarly, Y test denotes the comparison scores generated from U test .
The data division procedure is repeated 100 times in order to obtain 100 pairs of U train and U test ; and their corresponding comparison scores, Y train and Y test . From the training score set, Y train , we obtain the confidence intervals, the accuracy of which is then assessed using the DET curve derived from Y test .
2) 4 Data Sets and 13 Use-Cases:
In order to test the generalization ability of the DET confidence intervals, we have prepared four data sets in order to examine 13 use-cases of predicting DET confidence intervals. The four data sets are described below; and are summarised in Appendix. 3 
1) Zero-Effort and Spoof Attacks:
The first two data sets evaluate the effect of both zero-effort and spoof attacks on a fingerprint system. The two data sets differ only by the sensor used -one is based on the Biometrika sensor and another is based on the Italdata sensor. For each data set, the positive class consists of the live match (genuine) score, whereas the non-match scores consist of six sets -the spoof samples due to five fabrication materials and the zero-effort (non-match) comparison. Because there is only one set of match (genuine) score, hence one factor, P(Q|ω 1 ) = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]. However, for the non-match score sets, Q could take any of the six states. Therefore, P(Q|ω 0 ) is a probability table with six values. We have considered three scenarios, namely, a) Balanced attack: This consists of setting the probability of spoof attacks due to any of the five materials to be equal. In addition, probability of zero-effort attack is as likely as any of the spoof attack. For this reason, the prior probability of the non-match score is specified by:
and it is set the ratio The NFIQ that is applied to fingerprint enables us to divide the fingerprint samples into five levels of quality. However, the proportion of levels 4 and 5 are so small that we combine both of them. In order to obtain sufficient samples, this gives us the following four categories: 1, 2, 3, and 4&5. The match and nonmatch score sets are thus divided into these four subsets. We then considered three scenarios among the many possibilities: a) High quality tendency: This is the default case where the majority of the samples are of high quality (level 1 
B. Case Demonstrations
In this section, a demonstration of the derived DET confidence intervals of assessing biometric performance under varying levels of quality is given. The deomostration of other applications is presented in Appendix 3 . 
(i ) Varying Levels of Quality:
We repeated the same process of varying quality levels. In this case, we used the NIST fingerprint matcher (bozorth3) as well as its fingerprint quality, namely, NFIQ, which gives five levels of quality. Consequently, we divided each of the match and non-match comparison scores into four sets, thereby, binning the quality levels 1, 2 and 3 as three sets and the fourth set contains the combined quality levels 4 and 5. This is because the number of samples in this last set is often very small. The cdf s of the these eight score sets are shown in Figure 3(a) . As can be observed, the 1-cdf s of the non-match comparisons do not change significantly with quality measures, whereas the match comparisons vary significantly across the quality levels.
We then identify three scenarios with different quality tendency, namely high quality tendency, low quality tendency, and equal-prior quality. In the first case, quality level one (the best quality) has a stronger prior whereas the combined quality levels 4 and 5 (the worst quality) have a much smaller prior. In the second case, the priors are switched, causing the low quality samples to dominate. We, therefore, expect the DET curve of the second case to be significantly worse than the first case. In the third case, all quality levels are given the same prior, which is 1/4 in our case, since we have four sets of scores for each of the match and non-match comparisons. The results are shown in Figures 3(b)-(d) , respectively.
IV. DISCUSSION, EVALUATION AND RESULTS
This section addresses the issue of how well an unseen DET curve is predicted using the confidence intervals derived from the proposed procedure. For this purpose, there must be a training and a test set. One requirement is that the enrolled subjects in the two sets must be mutually exclusive. This reflects a real application whereby the population in the design set is usually different from those in the operational setting.
Before we provide any details about the experiments, we summarize a number of properties that we know about the confidence intervals of a DET curve. These not only allow us to rule out a number of hypotheses, but also enable us to design experiments testing the unknown.
A. What We Know, and We Do Not Know About DET Confidence Intervals
Poh et al. [10] designed a number of experiments in order to study the properties of the confidence intervals around a DET curve. Their findings can be summarized as follows:
• Between the sample variability and user-variability, the latter has a larger effect. For example, 1000 match comparison scores constituted by 100 subjects each contributing 10 match scores are more representative than 1000 match comparison scores constituted by 10 subjects each contributing 100 match scores. The DET confidence intervals estimated by the former will be more representative. Therefore, in order to generate enough samples, we recruit a large number of subjects rather than acquiring more samples from a limited pool of users.
• The DET confidence intervals estimated from a larger subject population will have smaller confidence intervals. Poh and Bengio showed that by increasing the size of the subject from 10, 20 and 40 to 80, the relative estimate of the corresponding DET confidence intervals are visibly reduced. They also objectively measured the reduction in terms of entropy, demonstrating that with an increasing size of subjects, the entropy decreases, hence, showing a sharper distribution of the DET curve or narrower confidence intervals.
• Using the DET curve of a completely different population of subjects for testing, the confidence intervals of a DET curve has a coverage of between 67% and 83%, depending on the choice of database and biometric systems.
Coverage is a measure of proportion of the predicted DET curve that falls in the visible region of the confidence intervals. In their conclusion section, the authors highlighted the challenge of generalizing a DET curve from one context to another. Poh and Bengio's two-step bootstrap procedure cannot generalize the DET curve as soon as the context of application changes because the method has no means of detecting factors or covariates that can influence the performance of a biometric system. The above conclusion directly points to the need for evaluating, how well one can predict the unseen DET curve, when the factors are explicitly identified. In light of this, it is imperative to evaluate the coverage of the proposed DET confidence intervals under different scenarios. For this purpose, we set up 13 use-cases from four data sets.
B. Evaluation Criteria
We shall introduce three assessment criteria, namely coverage and angle-dependent coverage, as well as the Komolgorov-Smirnov (KS) test of difference. While coverage is used to assess the quality of a predicted DET curve experimental outcome, angle-dependent coverage is used to assess the quality of prediction across a set of experiments, for a given DET angle. The KS-test measures the discrepancy between the training and test score distribution in order to gauge how much the mismatch in population may account to the imperfect prediction of a DET curve. Figure 4 illustrates an example of a test DET curve where a portion of the curve falls inside the DET confidence intervals and another portion falls outside the intervals. The portion that falls inside the intervals is the coverage. Although the computation of coverage is carried out in the polar coordinates, we have back-projected them to the (FMR,FNMR) coordinates for visualisation here. Although there is a one-toone correspondence between the two representations, the polar coordinates can sometimes capture points on the non-visible part of the DET curve; these points are excluded from the calculation of coverage.
2) Angle-Dependent Coverage: In addition to coverage, we also introduce another similar assessment known as angle-dependent coverage. While coverage is used to assess the outcome of a single instance of a predicted DET curve across all computable angles; angle-dependent coverage assesses the quality of prediction of a given angle, across a set of DET prediction experiments. We are interested in angledependent coverage because we want to see if the errors in predicting a DET curve (in terms of coverage) is distributed equally across all the angles or not.
In order to formalise the calculation of angle-dependent coverage, we consider only the computable angles, θ ∈ . We also use similar notation as before except that the DET curves in the polar coordinates are augmented by an experiment enumerator t = 1, . . . , T . Let r test,t (θ ) be the DET curve of the test set represented in the polar coordinate of experiment t; and similarly r upper train,t (θ ) and r lower train,t (θ ) be the upper and lower confidence bound, also of experiment t. The angle-dependent coverage is defined as the proportion of the valid (or computable) angle falling inside the confidence bound:
The above equation is repeated for all computable DET angles θ ∈ (between 0°a nd 90°). In short, the numerator in the above angle-dependent coverage counts the number of times out of T experiments that a given angle of the predicted DET curve falls inside its corresponding confidence intervals.
In practice, when carrying out the above calculation, the numerator is either T or less because we have to exclude the cases where some of the DET angles are not computable due to lack of data. This naturally happens because the countable errors are finite, especially at very low FNMR or FMR, noting that the precision of FNMR is smaller than that of FMR by one or two orders of magnitude depending on data sets. These cases translate to DET angles near 0°or 90°, respectively.
3) Test of Difference in Distribution Between the Training and Test Scores:
A key assumption of the proposed algorithm is that the factor-specific cdf of the training and the test sets are the same, that is, P train (y < τ|ω k , Q) and P test (y < τ|ω k , Q) comparable. Equivalently, we want to test the two samples that have been used to derive the above probabilities, namely, {y|Q k , training} and {y|Q k , test}, are the same. There are a number of tests that can be used, such as measuring relative entropy, test of means difference (student's t-test), or two-sample Komolgorove-Smirnov test (KS-test). While the first method requires an estimate of density, the second method is useful only for data where their means are meaningful, hence, implicitly assuming a single-mode distribution. The third method is non-parametric and does not require any estimate of the density. KS-test simply takes two cdf s and finds the maximum vertical distance between them, that is,
In our context, we can directly use P(y < τ|Q k , set} where set can either be the training or the test set, each replacing F 1 and F 2 above.
The null hypothesis of the KS-test is that the two score sets being compared are drawn from the same distribution whereas the alternative hypothesis is that they are drawn from two different distributions. The KS-stat is compared to a critical value that is dependent on the number of samples, as well as the significant level, α, which is set to 0.05. Alternatively, one can calculate the P-value of the KS-stat and check if this value exceeds the α level or not. A P-value that is smaller than the significant α level suggests that one can reject the null hypothesis. In summary, a high KS-stat is likely to lead to small P-value, which in turn leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis, suggesting that the two sets of data are different.
C. Results
We present three sets of experiments. The first aims to study the generalisation ability of the DET confidence intervals under population mismatch. The second set of experiments assesses the stability of factor-specific score distribution across two different populations of subjects. This represents a secondary but important analysis because it provides an explanation as to why perfect predictability cannot be achieved by explicitly measuring the discrepancy between training and test factor-specific score distributions. The third set aims to study if there is a particular DET angle that is harder to predict than others, that is, if FNMR is harder to predict than FMR, or vice-versa.
1) Coverage:
The coverage for all the 13 use-cases is shown in Figure 5 . Each box-plot contains 100 bootstrapped samples. The expected coverage is more than 75% for the first four score data sets. The range of coverage values obtained here is consistent with Poh and Bengio's study [10] . If we were to measure the coverage using the same training set, we would have obtained 100%. The discrepancy between the training and the test sets is possibly due to the mismatch in subjects between the training and the test sets. This is further verified in the next set of experiments.
The following observations can be made:
• The DET curves with zero-effort attacks are somewhat easier to predict than those with spoof attacks.
• The DET curves with cross-device comparison are somewhat harder to predict than those with a single-device only curves.
• The DET curves with high or low quality tendency curves can be predicted at the same or comparable level of accuracy.
2) Secondary Analysis:
The KS-stat and P-value for the 13 use-cases are shown in Figures 6(a) and (b) . In (c), the proportion of the null hypothesis being rejected, out of the 100 bootstrapped samples, is also plotted. As it turns out, most of the tests rejected the null hypothesis.
However, what is not expected is that the null hypotheses for the zero-effort attack and non-match comparisons are also rejected. This is because the KS-stat for the zero-effort impostor is very small, indicating that the pair of data sets should come from the same distribution. Consequently, we would have expected that its P-value to be relative large. See Figures 6(a) and (b) for the zero-effort non-match comparisons; (c) for Biometrika and Italdata non-match comparisons; and (d) for quality-dependent q1-q5 non-match comparisons.
However, in each case, their P-value turns out to distribute around zero. After a careful investigation, we found that this is because there are a lot more non-match samples, in the order of 400 thousand samples. As a result, the large KS-stat is offset by the large samples, leading to very small P-values for this class.
3) Angle-Dependent Coverage: As a final analysis, we look at the DET angle-dependent coverage. This looks at the 100 bootstraps of 13 use-cases. This enables to study the behaviour of 1,300 observations of DET coverage for each of the angles, θ ∈ {0 0 , . . . , 90 0 }. Each DET angle is divided into three parts: invalid or unobserved angle, covered, and uncovered angle. The invalid angles are those for which no value can be calculated simply because no data is available. The covered angles are those whose test DET curve is covered by the confidence intervals derived from the training data; whereas the uncovered angles are those falling outside the DET confidence intervals. Figure 7 (a) shows the frequency of the three types of DET angles derived from the 1,300 bootstrap experiments.
We note that the low DET angles which correspond to the low FNMR has no value. This is because the precision FNMR, is often significantly lower than that of the FMR. The low precision is due to the disproportionately smaller number of match samples than that of the non-match samples.
All the valid DET angles have a coverage between 57.5% and the maximum is 90.3%, as shown in Figure 7 . By using only the DET-angles that are valid, the 2.5-th, 50-th and the 97.5-th percentiles of the coverage across the valid DET-angle dependent curves are 60.5%, 70.1%, and 80.3%, respectively.
Our result here shows that there is little bias as to whether or not a particular angle of a DET curve is harder to predict. Put differently, every DET angle has an equal chance of being predicted correctly, and the probability of this is around 60% to 80% under an mismatched population; and they are significantly better than random, which is 50%. Without any mismatched population, the probability of this is 100%, which corresponds to the absolute upper bound. This shows that DET curve prediction task is difficult; and there is still much room for improvement.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a framework for computing a DET curve with confidence intervals, aiming to predict the most likely performance of a biometric system on an unseen target population of subjects. This is achieved by explicitly modelling the cdf s of the identified factors. We have demonstrated the feasibility of this approach on 4 different tasks across 13 use-cases. These tasks assess the following scenarios: the impact of the performance of the system under multiple sensors and quality levels, and nature of attacks (zero effort versus nonzero-effort impersonation). For each use-case scenario of a given task, we sampled two mutually exclusive sets of subjects, simulating a design and a target test environment with different subjects. The design data set is used to derive a DET confidence intervals whereas the test data set is used to assess to what extent the DET confidence intervals can predict the unseen DET curve. The prediction quality is measured in terms of coverage. Across 1,300 experiments with bootstrapping, we found that the coverage at the curve level, as well as at the DET angle level is between 60 and 80%. Although this performance is much better than chance, there is still room for improvement.
Across 1900 experiments, we found that the coverage at the curve level, as well as at the DET angle level is between 60 and 90%. Although this performance is much better than chance, there is still room for improvement.
